

# The Div Arty's Role in the Division as an ARFOR

## (or Why Captains Need to Understand the Operational Art)

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**Y**ou're a captain fresh out of the advanced course. You've done all of the things necessary to prepare you for the ultimate challenge in your career—battery command. Upon arriving at your new duty station, you report to the division artillery (Div Arty) S1. You sent an introductory letter to the Div Arty commander—but just to make sure, you emphasize to the S1 you want to command. A knowing smile follows: "Captain, the wait for command is at least one year. We've assigned you to the division FSE [fire support element] as a planner."

*Ugh!* Your trudge across post to meet the deputy fire support coordinator (DFSCoord) allows you time for an attitude adjustment. Looking on the bright side, in the FSE, you'll have more exposure to the Div Arty commander than most of your peers—if you do your job well, you can get that battery command in a year.

Your in-brief with the DFSCoord goes well until he gets to the training calendar.

"Captain, the next major event is Rolling Thunder. The division will act as the ARFOR [Army forces] headquarters for a JTF [joint task force]. This is a mission we rarely have the opportunity to train for. Our headquarters will be operating at the operational level of war.

"We're conducting OPD [officer professional development] and developing SOPs [standing operating procedures] to prepare for the exercise. I need you to be intimately familiar with the procedures we'll follow prior to execution."

*Uh, oh.* The advanced course didn't prepare you for this, and it has been a long time since you've cracked open Sun Tzu and Clausewitz.

An unlikely scenario? Not at all. More and more missions encountered today and in the future will be limited in nature but have strategic and operational significance. The 10th Mountain

Division's role in Somalia is one example.

So how familiar are you with the operational art of war? What's different about fighting the Div Arty as part of an ARFOR versus a division? What's the doctrine? Do tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) exist?

### Operational Operating Systems

One of the major differences in your role in the FSE supporting an ARFOR is the tasks you must perform, as described in the Universal Joint Task List.<sup>1</sup> While you still have tactical requirements, your focus must shift to the operational level, both in your own mission and dealings with the JTF. The six operational-level operating systems are movement and maneuver, protection, command and con-

trol, intelligence, support and firepower. No longer are you dealing with fire support, per se. Your overarching task is to "employ operational firepower," which includes conducting joint force targeting and attacking operational targets (see Figure 1).

These sub-tasks go well beyond your previous scope of responsibility and expertise. They encompass air tasking orders (ATOs), combat assessment, non-lethal attack, offensive counterair and interdiction, to name but a few.<sup>2</sup> So, do you have to develop expertise in all these areas or should you augment your FSE with experts? The answer—both. Let's look at an example that may shed some light on your new responsibilities and the expertise required to deal with them.

The ARFOR mission in Rolling Thunder is a peace enforcement mission that may require providing humanitarian assistance to belligerent forces. This supports an operational center of gravity aimed at ensuring a perception of fairness among the belligerents. The ARFOR is responsible for ensuring assistance convoys are escorted and protected and distributing food when it arrives.

Minimal FSE requirements, right? Think again. One of your most important sub-tasks is to "conduct non-lethal attack on operational targets." Your responsibility is to do what you do best—conduct the deep "fight."




Figure 1: Operational Level of War Firepower Tasks

Div Artys are proficient at conducting deep operations and shaping the battlefield with lethal fires and electronic warfare (EW). Our combat training centers (CTCs) have ensured that. But are you prepared to “strike” a target with psychological operations (PSYOP), with civil affairs (CA)? How about integrate public affairs (PA) into your operations? If you receive human intelligence (HUMINT) that belligerent artillery batteries will attack the convoy, are you prepared to respond, given the restrictive rules of engagement (ROE)?

## Non-Lethal Firepower

You’ve probably never thought of integrating information warfare as non-lethal fires under the lead of the FSCOORD and his FSE. Consider this: does PSYOP have a target or target audience? CA or PA? If so, perhaps the targeting process—*decide, detect, deliver, assess*—is the best methodology for the integration effort. The FSCOORD has the experience and rank to pull this shaping effort together. He has a staff that’s trained in the methodology and an established battle rhythm the division understands. He does need help, however, in both subject matter experts and liaisons.

An ARFOR should be augmented by a dedicated command and control warfare (C<sup>2</sup>W) cell. This staff section contains experts in PSYOP, physical destruction, EW, deception and operations security (OPSEC). PSYOP, physical destruction and EW represent the major targeting functions of C<sup>2</sup>W, and the C<sup>2</sup>W officer, doctrinally, brings these functions to the targeting meeting for integration.<sup>3</sup> Additionally, the C<sup>2</sup>W cell habitually coordinates with CA and PA<sup>4</sup>; their inclusion in the cell makes sense and has proven effective in training and information operations war games.<sup>5</sup> For a notional C<sup>2</sup>W cell, see Figure 2.

Consider our example. G3 Plans, as always, takes the lead in war-gaming courses of action (COAs) for the operation. Representatives of all the operational operating systems are present to integrate and synchronize their actions for success. You represent the firepower operating system.

Firepower, as expected, will provide an initial prep or “deep strike” (in this case, information warfare) to shape the battlespace. Additionally, the firepower operating system will play an integral role in attacking belligerent artillery, if it fires on the convoy.




Figure 2: A Notional C<sup>2</sup>W Cell. This cell works for the G3 and provides input to the targeting cell.

You take the results of the G3 war game for the selected COA back to the FSE to further integrate and synchronize the activities of the assets you control. The firepower synch produces a “deep strike” where PSYOP informs the local populace of the relief effort. PSYOP personnel may do this by air-dropped leaflets, loudspeaker or even handbills. Having the PSYOP expert at your synch drill ensures you’ll use the most efficient means available.

Also as part of the “deep strike,” CA will inform local officials, establish the distribution sites for food and ensure equitable distribution among the populace. PA will ensure the widest possible coverage of the event, thereby providing truthful public information that portrays the effort as being fair to all.

In this phase, PSYOP has the additional mission of informing belligerent artillery batteries of knowledge of their intent and the consequences if they attack. This effort is backed up by a show-of-force that could include fighter flyovers and an AC-130 combat air patrol (CAP), given the enemy has a limited air defense capability.

If this initial “deep strike” is effective and if you have properly shaped the battlespace, the close fight (counterfire against belligerent artillery) may never be joined. Naturally, you prepare for the close fight by positioning radars, establishing priority targets and arranging for attack helicopter escorts, as necessary. Still, the importance of the initial shaping effort with non-lethal fires cannot be overemphasized.

This mission and the assets described to support it fit the Army’s targeting methodology. The “perception of fairness” is the operational center of gravity and so certainly will be established as a high-payoff target (HPT) during initial crisis planning. This is the *decide* phase.

*Detect* relies heavily on HUMINT when focusing on non-traditional HPTs, such as perceptions. Perhaps Special Operations Forces (SOF) integrated in the community or among the belligerent forces will hear of the planned artillery strike and report it. CA may hear of it in its dealings in civil-military commissions. While it may sound strange to think of these examples as sensor-shooter links, that’s exactly what they are.

The example speaks in detail of the *delivery* phase of the non-lethal fires assets.

*Assess* is a difficult yet critical part of this mission. How do you determine if perceptions of the people have been changed by the delivery of aid? You may have to have PSYOP personnel survey the people as to their feelings once the aid begins to flow. CA also could receive feedback in its dealings with local officials. Having these functions fully integrated into the targeting process under the lead of the FSCOORD ensures these assessments will get back to the right place for consideration and “restrike,” as necessary. For an example of the joint targeting process with notations of non-lethal fires to shape conditions (perceptions) on the battlefield, see Figure 3 on Page 8.




Figure 3: Joint Targeting Process with Notations for Non-Lethal Fires

It is apparent that for this process to succeed, the addition of the C<sup>2</sup>W cell is critical. But what other expertise or interfaces must occur beyond those usually found in the FSE?

## Army-Air Force Interface

The request for a fighter fly-over is no different than before. You submit a preplanned air request to corps. If you need to send an immediate close air support (CAS) request to support a convoy, your air liaison officer (ALO) uses his air channels to the corps' air support operations center (ASOC) to secure that support. Right?

Wrong! Don't forget—you're the ARFOR. There's no corps, no ASOC. The next level of command is the JTF. The joint force commander (JFC) may have selected a joint force air component commander (JFACC) to control the JFC's air power. If so, you need to coordinate with that headquarters, something a division normally does not do. Again, augmentation may be your best answer.

The battlefield coordination detachment (BCD)—previously called an ele-

ment (BCE)—can provide the liaison essential to the air-ground operations effort from the ARFOR headquarters to the JFACC. Normally the BCD works in the JFACC's headquarters at echelons-above-corps in the air operations center (AOC). The BCD analyzes the land battle for the JFACC and serves as an interface between components to exchange intelligence and operational data as well as support requirements.

Because the division may not be comfortable with how a BCD operates in an AOC or understand what information exchange should take place between the respective operations centers, the division should request BCD augmentation to their headquarters. The BCD cell can help the division commander and his staff pose the right questions and formulate their air support needs for forwarding to the JFACC. The size of the cell is mission-dependent, but you don't want to request such a large cell that it inhibits BCD operations in the JFACC's AOC.

Another area the division may consider requesting augmentation for is the division ALO and his tactical air control party (TACP). Most likely, the TACP isn't manned, equipped or trained to coordinate for air support of an ARFOR. The ALO can augment his

staff with equipment and trained personnel identified through mission analysis to provide the ARFOR the support it needs—air interdiction and CAS development, intelligence, joint suppression of enemy air defenses (J-SEAD), logistical support and airlift expertise.

You should be able to access the Air Force's contingency theater automated planning system (CTAPS) through your ALO. CTAPS automates the AOC and ASOC battle staff planning and management functions. Access to the system will tie you and your ALO directly to the JFACC and BCD, allowing for better mission support.

CTAPS provides information on a multitude of related areas, including the details for ATO planning, generation and dissemination; the airspace control order (ACO); and information on targeting data, aircraft times, air defense status and E-Mail listings, to name a few. Without this information, it is difficult for your ALO to support the ARFOR headquarters. As a result, depending on the number of systems and trained operators available, the division headquarters/ARFOR should have a CTAPS terminal for immediate access to the information.

## Doctrine for Division as an ARFOR

At a minimum, current doctrine provides a start point for the study of the division as an ARFOR. Even if the ARFOR mission doesn't rate inclusion in your mission-essential task list (METL), you should have the right doctrinal manuals available in the FSE.

Although the new *FM 71-100 Division Operations* touches on the requirements for the ARFOR, it is cursory at best. The bottom line is that the footlocker full of manuals you normally take to the field probably won't give you much insight into the joint world, so you'll need to research and gather appropriate materials.

One of the best Army manuals is *FM 100-7 Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations*. It has a chapter that is essentially a primer on the operational operating systems and an expanded discussion of the firepower operating system. The *Universal Joint Task List, Version 2.1* (Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Manual 3500.04) lists and describes all fires tasks at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. It is a



must for any Div Arty that anticipates a mission to support its division acting as an ARFOR.

Ten long years after the passage of the Department of Defense (DoD) Reorganization Act dictating the armed services develop joint doctrine and train together, joint doctrine and warfighting are here and here to stay. *Joint Pub 3-09 Doctrine for Joint Fire Support* is in final draft. *Joint Pub 3-13.1, Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare* is an excellent reference for integrating non-lethal fires. *Joint Pub 3-56.1 Command and Control for Joint Air Operations* discusses the role of the JFACC, joint ATO, BCD and joint targeting cycle. All joint publications are now in the Joint Electronic Library (JEL), which is on a CD-ROM. (The JEL CD-ROM is available through normal channels to get publications.)

Most often, our divisions will be called upon to operate as an ARFOR in a time of crisis—the worst possible time to start determining staff organization and responsibilities. The information age

guarantees that even our most junior soldiers will perform acts that may have operational or even strategic significance. Our junior leaders must be prepared for these missions—must understand the operational art of war and their role in potential missions.

With the proliferation of operations other than war, we must recognize the importance of non-lethal fires as well as the vertical and horizontal operational links required for success in employing them. Waiting until tomorrow could be too late.



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### Notes:

1. Universal Joint Task List, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3500.04 Version 2.1 (Washington, DC, 15 May 1995).
2. Ibid., 2-83 to 2-88.
3. Joint Publication 3-13.1, *Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare* (Washington, DC, February, 1996), II-9.

4. Ibid., IV-6.

5. A Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)-directed information operations war game was conducted from 14 to 21 November 1995 at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. Results showed the need for integrating CA and PA into the C<sup>2</sup>W cell.

17 June 1995, Camp Shelby, Mississippi: 3d Battalion, 83d Field Artillery (US Army Reserve) emplaces a howitzer—the only horse-drawn M198 in the world—to fire the battalion's last round before inactivation. (Guidon bearer is First Sergeant Donnie Welch, D Battery.)

